

The Price of Thirst

People do not move because they want to. They move because the physics of their situation has made staying more dangerous than leaving. Water is more often than not the first physics.

The standard framing of migration as primarily a political or economic phenomenon misses the physical layer underneath it. Political instability and economic hardship are real drivers of migration. But they are frequently downstream of a more fundamental driver: the failure of the physical systems — water, food, climate — that make a place livable. When those systems fail, people do not wait for political reform or economic recovery. They move toward the nearest stable system that will accept them. This is not a policy choice. It is physics.

The World Bank's 2021 Groundswell report estimated that by 2050, without action on climate and development, 216 million people could be forced to move within their own countries due to slow-onset climate impacts — water scarcity, declining crop productivity, rising sea levels, and extreme heat. That figure covers internal migration only. The number of people moving across international borders in response to the same pressures is harder to estimate but directionally consistent: upward, sustained, and accelerating.

Where the Pressure Is Building

Sub-Saharan Africa faces the combination of rapid population growth, declining agricultural productivity in key regions, and water stress that is intensifying faster than adaptation infrastructure can be built. The Lake Chad basin, which once covered 25,000 square kilometers and sustained agriculture and fishing for roughly 30 million people, has shrunk by 90 percent since the 1960s. The communities that depended on it have not disappeared. They have moved — into already-stressed cities, across already-porous borders, and in some cases toward the Mediterranean and ultimately toward Europe.

Central America's Dry Corridor — the arc of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua — has experienced prolonged drought conditions that have devastated subsistence agriculture for the smallholder farmers who make up a significant portion of the rural population. The correlation between drought severity in the Dry Corridor and migration pressure at the US southern border is not a coincidence. It is a causal relationship operating on a two-to-three year lag: drought destroys a harvest, households exhaust their savings, families make the migration decision in the following season. The US immigration debate treats this as a border problem. The physics of it begins in a field in Guatemala that received 40 percent of normal rainfall for the third consecutive year.

South Asia faces the combination of glacial retreat in the Himalayas — the glaciers that feed the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra river systems are losing mass at accelerating rates — and groundwater depletion in the agricultural plains of India and Pakistan that rivals the North China Plain in its severity. The Indo-Gangetic Plain, which produces roughly a quarter of India's food supply, is drawing down groundwater at rates that satellite gravity measurements have confirmed are unsustainable. The timeline for when this constraint becomes acute is measured in decades, not centuries. The migration implications of agricultural failure in a region of 700 million people are not analytically separable from the question of global stability.

The Geometry of Flow

Migration does not flow randomly. It flows along the paths of least resistance toward the most stable, wealthy, and open systems available. This geometry is predictable and has been stable across decades and across very different political environments. People from Sub-Saharan Africa move toward Europe. People from Central America and the Caribbean move toward the United States. People from South and Southeast Asia move toward the Gulf states, Australia, Europe, and the United States. The specific routes change. The directional logic does not.

The receiving systems — the United States, the European Union, Australia, Canada — are not passive recipients of this flow. They make policy choices about how much flow to accept, through what channels, under what conditions. But they cannot make policy choices that repeal the underlying physics. A border that is closed to legal migration is not closed to the pressure that produces migration. It is only closed to the formal management of that pressure. The pressure remains.

This is the critical point that most immigration policy debates miss: the choice is not between having migration and not having it. The choice is between managing it through formal, predictable, capacity-matched systems that can be adjusted as conditions change, and managing it through crisis response at the point of arrival, which is more expensive, less humane, and less controllable than formal management would be. The physics of migration does not respond to enforcement rhetoric. It responds to the physical conditions in the sending regions — conditions that enforcement cannot alter.

Resilience as a Foreign Policy Question

The domestic resilience loop described in Part 1 of this series is pressurized partly by external flows — migration driven by water stress, food insecurity, and political instability in other regions. That means domestic resilience is not purely a domestic question. The investments that reduce water stress in the Dry Corridor of Central America — irrigation infrastructure, drought-resistant crop varieties, water management capacity — are also investments in reducing the migration pressure that arrives at the US southern border two to three years later. They are less expensive than the crisis response they prevent. They are also less politically visible, which is why they consistently lose the budget competition to enforcement.

The same logic applies to the Mekong basin, to Sub-Saharan Africa, to South Asia. Investments in the physical resilience of sending regions are investments in the stability of receiving regions. The return is real, measurable, and delayed — which is precisely the combination that political systems find hardest to fund.

The price of thirst is paid twice: once by the people who have no water, and once by the systems they move toward when the water runs out. The second price is almost always higher than the first would have cost to prevent.

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The strongest counterargument

The most serious challenge to the migration-as-physics argument is that it elides the role of political institutions in determining migration outcomes. The steelman: if water stress were the

primary driver of international migration, the correlation between climate stress indices and migration flows would be substantially tighter than the empirical record shows. In fact, countries with comparable water stress levels show widely divergent migration rates; countries with severe water stress but strong institutional capacity (Morocco, Jordan) produce less outmigration than countries with moderate water stress but weak governance (Honduras, El Salvador). This suggests that the governance layer, not the physical layer, is the primary determinant of migration rates — which means the "physics" framing, while rhetorically powerful, may misidentify the point of intervention.

This objection is partially correct and important to engage directly. The governance layer is real and consequential. Jordan and Morocco have managed water stress better than their resource positions would predict, partly through institutional investment and partly through international assistance tied to governance benchmarks. The objection correctly identifies that physical stress is necessary but not sufficient for high outmigration — political institutions mediate the relationship. The Lake Chad example supports this: the 90 percent shrinkage occurred over six decades during which outmigration was episodic rather than continuous, tracking institutional collapse in specific countries rather than the physical trend.

The response is that this objection strengthens rather than undermines the policy implication. If governance mediates the physical-to-migration pathway, then the investments that build governance capacity in physically stressed regions — functioning water authorities, agricultural extension services, property rights that allow farmers to respond to price signals — are even higher-return interventions than pure infrastructure investments. The framework does not argue that physics is destiny; it argues that physics sets the boundary conditions within which governance operates, and that ignoring the physical layer produces governance responses calibrated to the wrong problem. The Dry Corridor example remains: drought severity in Guatemala tracks US border crossings at a two-to-three year lag even after controlling for political variables. The physics is not everything. It is not nothing.

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The global version of this pressure flows toward the most stable systems available. The American version of the same problem has been running quietly at home for decades — on a slower timeline, through different mechanisms, but driven by the same underlying physics.

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About the Author

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